The Battle of Karnal (Persian: نبرد کرنال) (24 February 1739) was a decisive victory for Nader Shah, the founder of the Afsharid dynasty of Iran, during his invasion of India. Nader's forces defeated the army of Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah within three hours, paving the way for the Iranian sack of Delhi. The engagement is considered the crowning jewel in Nader's military career as well as a tactical masterpiece. The battle took place near Karnal in Haryana, 110 kilometres (68 mi) north of Delhi, India. As a result of the overwhelming defeat of the Mughal Empire at Karnal, the already-declining Mughal dynasty was critically weakened to such an extent as to hasten its demise. According to Axworthy, it is also possible that without the ruinous effects of Nader's invasion of India, European colonial takeover of the Indian subcontinent would have come in a different form or perhaps not at all.
Nader's entry into the Mughal Empire
The events at the Delhi court during Nadir’s invasion reveal a story of shocking inefficiency. News of Kabul’s loss in June 1738 reached Delhi in early July, yet nothing was done to secure the borders for many months. Even after Nadir Shah crossed the Khyber Pass in November, it was two months before any decisive action was taken. On 2 December 1738, the Emperor officially permitted his three top nobles—Itimad-ad-Daula, Qamar-ud-Din Khan (the wazir), Nizam-ul-Mulk, Asaf Jah I (the regent), and Samsam‑ud‑daulah Khan Dauran (the military head)—to move against the invader and provided them with funds. Instead of promptly addressing the threat, however, they set up camp outside Delhi in the Shalimar Garden near Sarai Baoli and wasted an entire month.
When news came on 10 January 1739 that Nadir Shah had crossed the river at Attock, the imperial army was finally urged to act. The court still placed its hopes on Governor Zakariya Khan to make a stand, but when he proved unable to resist Nadir Shah, some courtiers even accused him of treachery—alleging that he had surrendered Lahore fort to the Persians because of his shared background with Nadir.
At the first sign of Nadir Shah’s advance, the court recognised its own shortcomings and called on the experienced Nizam for advice. A veteran of Aurangzeb’s era, the Nizam was known for his wisdom and diplomacy, yet he was not given full command or the confidence of the Emperor, whose trust lay with Khan Dauran and the local faction. Khan Dauran, who admired Rajput bravery, even sent messengers to call on his protégés among the Hindu Rajputs, especially Sawai Jai Singh, to aid the Emperor. However, longstanding alienation had left the Rajput chieftains reluctant to act, with many now seeking independence and even inviting the Marathas to help dismantle the Empire. The Emperor eventually appealed to Baji Rao for help, and the Peshwa promised to send the Malwa force under leaders such as Malhar Rao Holkar, Ranuji Sindhia, and Udaji Puar. Nevertheless, this expected assistance never arrived in time. Not only did no Dakhini force come to aid at Karnal, but the Maratha envoy even fled, and Baji Rao later considered defending the Narmada line to block further advances by Nadir. A coordinated Maratha defence of northern India simply did not happen.
The imperial forces spent the month of Ramzan (December 1738) outside Delhi without any significant action. Once it was confirmed that the Persians had crossed at Attock, the three nobles finally began marching toward Lahore on 10 January 1739, urging the Emperor to join them immediately. Soon after, they reached Panipat, where on that same day Muhammad Shah left Delhi and later joined his generals who had been waiting. By that time, news of Nadir’s capture of Lahore had already reached the court, making it impossible to save the city. It was then decided to set up camp and await the enemy at Karnal, a location with abundant water from a canal and open plains suitable for manoeuvring large cavalry units. This pause also allowed time for additional forces, including 30,000 horsemen from the governor of Oudh and reinforcements from Rajputana, to join. Advised by the Nizam, the Emperor’s counsellors decided to fortify their position at Karnal rather than risk an immediate battle. Under the direction of Sad‑ud‑din Khan Mir Atash, the camp was enclosed by a long mud wall with artillery arranged along it, and soldiers were stationed in trenches to keep constant watch.
Muhammad Shah gathers a large force
Rustam Ali estimates that the Persian force at Karnal numbered about 55,000 mounted soldiers—a figure believed to be nearly accurate. According to Mirza Mahdi’s account, Nadir Shah had left Persia with around 80,000 men. Even though he recruited Afghans along the way and possibly got extra troops from his homeland, he had to set aside many soldiers to hold conquered forts, secure his long communication line, and escort his eldest son back to Persia. Hanway notes that when Nadir reached Tilawri (near Azimabad), he had 40,000 men with him, not counting those in his front and rear. In total, his camp contained roughly 160,000 people. About one-third of these were servants who were mounted—and some were fully armed—so they could help in raiding or protecting the baggage. There were also over 6,000 women, dressed in large crimson coats much like the men’s, making them hard to distinguish from afar.
Conquests by Nader's invading army had caused much consternation at the Mughal court of Muhammad Shah residing in Delhi. Nizam‑ul‑Mulk was summoned to the Emperor's presence, and many summons were sent out across northern India for the contribution of military forces. 13 December saw the Mughal army march out of Delhi to confront the invading forces to the north. The enormity of its size was such that the length of the column was 25 kilometres and the width was 3 kilometres. Muhammad Shah himself joined this army. Due to the cumbersome size of the Mughal army, Muhammad Shah could not take his forces any further than Karnal, approximately 120 kilometres north of Delhi. In total, Muhammad Shah commanded a war‑camp of 300,000 troops—including non‑combatants—equipped with 3,000 guns along with 2,000 war elephants. Out of these, the forces deployed on the field numbered 75,000. Despite the large numbers at the Mughal's disposal, they suffered from obsolescent war materiel and antiquated tactical systems. Almost all of the guns in the army were far too large in calibre to be considered field artillery, as they were practically impossible to manoeuvre during battle and took such a long time to reload that they would have minimal effect even in cases of correct utilisation. In contrast, most of Nader's artillery was lighter and much more manoeuvrable than that of their Mughal counterparts, as well as the zamburaks, which provided extra mobile fire power. In contrast to the Mughal army's infantry, all of the 20,000 Persian musketeers (jazayerchi) were uniformed, drilled, and homogeneously organised. Although the 50,000 cavalry contingent in the Mughal army was of excellent quality, there was nothing to suggest a common and cohesive underlying military structure set out for their deployment and use. The Persian cavalry was composed of two parts: the state troops, which were trained and drilled via a uniform system, and the auxiliary troops, which were recruited into the Imperial army after the conquest of their homeland.
Preparation
Karnal is located on an ancient highway between Delhi and Lahore, positioned north of the Mughal capital and Panipat and just south of Taraori, a place known for many historic battles. Kurukshetra, famous for the legendary war between the Pandavas and Kauravas, is nearby. This setting made Karnal a natural stage for a major battle between Indian and Persian forces.
The town is bordered on the east by a canal built by Ali Mardan Khan. Between this canal and the Jamuna lies a broad, flat plain suitable for large-scale cavalry maneuvers. Muhammad Shah had set up a fortified camp along the west bank of the canal, with Karnal lying immediately to its south. To the north, the land changes from a dense jungle to an open plain, offering natural protection: the jungle guarded the front while the canal defended the right side. The Mughal army was arranged with the Nizam in the lead, supported by artillery, the Wazir on the left, the Emperor in the center, and Khan Dauran on the right.
In February 1739, Nadir Shah reached Sarai Azimabad early one morning. Elite horsemen from Kurdistan, led by Haji Khan, had already scouted along both sides of the canal and gathered intelligence at the edge of the Mughal camp. With this information, Nadir Shah decided against a frontal attack. Instead, he moved east of Karnal, staying near the Jamuna for water, and planned to cut off the Mughal communication line with Delhi by taking Panipat from behind. His goal was to force Muhammad Shah either to leave his strong position and fight on Persian terms or to remain trapped while the Persians advanced toward Delhi.
Before dawn the next day, the Persian army left Sarai Azimabad, crossed the canal well to the east of the town, and set up camp on a flat plain northeast of Karnal, near Kunjpura and in sight of the Jamuna. At the same time, Nadir Shah rode close to the Mughal camp to assess its strength and layout before returning to his tents. Later that evening, he learned that Saadat Khan was arriving at Panipat with a large force of cavalry, artillery, and supplies to aid the Mughal Emperor. In response, the Persians sent one division to intercept him and another strong unit to threaten the camp’s eastern flank, while smaller groups of skirmishers moved in to cut off any potential reinforcements.
Battle
On the fateful Tuesday morning of February 13, 1739, the Persian army moved out in three separate groups along a wide plain between a canal and the Jamuna river. The center force, led by Prince Nasr-ullah, was ordered to leave the riverbank and take up a position directly north of the Mughal camp where it could face the division commanded by the Nizam. Meanwhile, Nadir Shah, heading the lead group, first reached a point opposite the Mughal position along the canal. However, when he learned that Saadat Khan had joined the Mughal Emperor during the night, he quickly veered to his left and set up his camp on a large, open field a short distance east of the enemy and close to the river. His son soon arrived to join him at this new central position. By mid-morning, as the sun began to lower from its highest point, the Mughal soldiers unexpectedly emerged from their lines, ready to fight.
Inside the Mughal camp, the situation was already tense. Responding to the Emperor’s urgent call for help, Saadat Khan had left his home province of Oudh with 20,000 cavalry, along with artillery and war supplies. He had marched continuously for a month, stopping briefly only in Delhi on February 7 before quickly moving on. Covering a long distance in just a few days, he pushed on through Panipat and, on February 12, made a final determined effort to cover the last stretch, arriving at Karnal by midnight with the main force. Unfortunately, his baggage train lagged far behind in an unprotected line—a common issue with Indian armies.
Meanwhile, Persian scouts had advanced from their camp and gathered clear information about Saadat Khan’s position. The Mughal intelligence, however, had failed to notice these movements and had not taken steps to safeguard their baggage. According to an account by Ghulam Husain, no one in the camp was aware of Nadir Shah’s imminent arrival from Lahore until some local fodder collectors, who had gone out to fetch food, returned injured and terrified after a sudden encounter with Persian scouts, crying out that “Nadir has come!” This news spread quickly, causing panic in the camp and increasing the urgency for reinforcements.