The Battle of Kápolna was one of the decisive battles of the Hungarian war of Independence of 1848–1849, fought on 26 and 27 February 1849 between the Hungarian revolutionary army led by Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński and the Austrian main army operating in Hungary Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz. After the Austrian offensive from the winter of 1848–1849, which resulted in losing the Western part of the country, the Hungarian army tried its first major counter-attack, but due to the disastrous leadership of the Polish Henryk Dembiński, the battle ended with an Austrian victory, and this did not influence only the military situation, but also the politics of central Europe: Franz Joseph I announced the March Constitution of Austria on 4 March 1849.
Background
With the breakthrough at Branyiszkó on 5 February 1849 by the Corps of the Upper Danube led by General Artúr Görgei, the concentration of the Hungarian armies against the invading Austrian troops became possible. A commander-in-chief had to be found to lead the Hungarian main army. The chairman of the Commission of National Defence (the de facto Hungarian Government after the resignation of the Batthyány Government), Lajos Kossuth, was angered by General Artúr Görgei's (the most capable general of the Hungarian army) Declaration of Vác from 5 January 1849, their relations deteriorated, and so he invited Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński, who was then living in French exile, to Hungary and appointed him commander-in-chief on 29 January 1849. The Polish general "imported" from France, Dembiński, one of the former commanders-in-chief of the Polish War of Independence of 1830–31, who was invited to Hungary from Paris by László Teleki in early January, seemed a convenient choice for Kossuth, who in this way prevented Görgei to take over the command of the Hungarian main army. His former activity as a military leader also seemed promising. The general became famous in Europe with his successful retreat from Lithuania in 1831, and his name was obviously not unknown to Kossuth, who had followed the events of the Polish War of Independence of 1830–1831 in his youth.
Immediately after the Polish general was assigned as commander-in-chief, Lajos Kossuth and the Commission of National Defence (OHB) began to urge Dembiński to launch an attack in order to drive the Austrian troops out of Hungary, but the latter kept postponing the attack, citing various unfounded reasons (such as the fear of a combined attack of the Serbian forces from the South with the Austrian main army from the West). Finally, upon Kossuth's constant urging, he decided to launch the attack on 22 February.
Despite his promising past as a military commander, the appointment of Dembiński proved to be an unfortunate choice. He had no experience conducting an offensive campaign or battle because he only led defensive and retreat operations during his time as a commander. The Lieutenant General's secretive, distrustful nature, and his impulsive, impetuous behavior were not suitable for winning the sympathy of the Hungarian corps commanders. First, he had a quarrel with General Mór Perczel, then he complained about Colonel György Klapka to Kossuth, and then he got into a heated argument with Artur Görgei.
On the other side of the frontline the situation was the following. On 5 January 1849 the Austrian imperial army (K.u.K.) led by Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz entered the Hungarian capitals Buda and Pest, the occupied the western, northwestern and central parts of Hungary. Being followed by Austrian forces, the Hungarian Corps of the Upper Danube led by General Artúr Görgei retreated through Northern Hungary, in order to join with the rest of the forces, which tried to defend Eastern Hungary across the left banks of the Tisza river.
But the attack against Hungary was not only from the west. From the north an Austrian corps led by Lieutenant General Franz Schlik entered the country from Galicia at the beginning of December and pushed forward rapidly, soon capturing the important city of Kassa. The Hungarians tried to stop Schlik, but the newly formed Upper Tisza Corps led by the minister of defence, Major General Lázár Mészáros suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Kassa from Schlik, who had his way open towards Debrecen, where the Hungarian government retreated. In this very desperate situation, György Klapka took command of the demoralized troops. The Hungarian general broke the Austrians' momentum in the battles of Tokaj and Tarcal, forcing Schlik to retreat to Kassa. At the same time, Dembiński was put in charge of the Upper Danube and the former Bácska and Bánság corps, becoming the new commander-in-chief.
After his victory at Branyiszkó, Görgei's Corps of the Upper Danube appeared behind Schlik's troops, threatening to surround, in cooperation with Klapka's troops, the Austrian army. Sensing the threat to Schlik's corps and the activity of the Hungarian troops, Windisch-Grätz moved his troops towards the Tisza river in mid-February.
Dembiński made Tiszafüred his base of operations and intended to fight the decisive battle around Mezőkövesd and Eger. The plan was that, before this, two divisions of the Hungarian army had to carry out a Demonstration (military) against the K.u.K. Brigade defending the city of Szolnok to divide the Austrian main army, by attracting there important enemy units. Then the Hungarian main forces would advance along the Pest highway and cut off the Austrian forces trapped in the Szolnok area, and after the decisive victory around Kápolna and Eger, would liberate the capital. However, Dembiński was so obsessed with his plan that he forbade even the effective pursuit of the isolated Schlik corps, on the assumption that if Schlik was severely defeated, Windisch-Grätz would not dare to move out from Budapest, and then his much-desired battle between Mezőkövesd and Eger would not be fought. Dembiński intended to launch the attack in early March. This explains why, when Klapka tried to attack Schlik's corps from two directions at Pétervására on 24 February, Dembiński ordered one of his columns back, and the desired success was again prevented by the commander-in-chief. At the same time, Dembiński wanted to wait before attacking the main army, because János Damjanich's and Károly Vécsey's divisions would have arrived at Szolnok site by then, in order to carry out the planned diversionary attack, and until then he intended to take up a position along the Tarna river's line with his main force. But surprisingly, he did not wait for that to happen, and on the 24th he had already ordered his troops to advance.
Prelude
In the meantime Schlik also suspected that the Hungarian troops tried to concentrate, preparing a counter-offensive, so he started to advance to get more accurate information but soon realized that the Hungarian forces were more numerous than expected. In the meantime, Windisch-Grätz sent the Colloredo Brigade to reconnoiter, which found Hungarian outposts at Kompolt on 17 February. Then, Arisztid Dessewffy's hussars ambushed the 5th Auersperger Regiment of the K.u.K. Army in the Battle of Kompolt on 18 February, putting them to flight, as a result of which the Colloredo brigade retreated to Hatvan, from where they sent a report of this to Pest. From this report Windisch-Grätz learned on 18–19 February 1849 that the Hungarian main army was concentrated around Mezőkövesd and Eger, and probably intended to attack Pest. As a result of this, Windisch-Grätz started to march towards that region with his troops on 23 February. He wanted to concentrate his troops in the area of Gödöllő and then move on the Hatvan-Hort-Gyöngyös-Kápolna route to meet the Hungarian main forces. The purpose of the Field Marshal was twofold: on the one hand, he wanted to prevent the Hungarian army from concentrating and advancing, and on the other, he wanted to establish contact with Schlik's corps, with which he had hitherto only maintained contact by envoys. However, the orders he issued continued to reflect indecision. On 21 February, he wrote to Schlik that he intended to clash with the Hungarians at Mezőkövesd.
If they accepted the fight and lost, they could retreat towards either Poroszló or Miskolc. In the former case, it was up to him, in the latter to Schlik, to cut off their retreat. If the enemy did not accept the battle, he would use the occasion, according to circumstances, to destroy the bridge at Poroszló, or to cross it, or finally to take some other decision appropriate to the state of affairs. For this attack Windisch-Grätz mobilized the II Corps led by Lieutenant General Ladislaus von Wrbna and the brigade of Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić's corps led by Lieutenant General Karl Zeisberg. The imperial commander-in-chief had only 17,000 soldiers at his disposal for this campaign because he had left considerable forces behind to defend the capital, while he could not take with him the corps of Lieutenant-General Baron Josip Jelačić, who was securing the Danube–Tisza Interfluve, because he needed his soldiers for the attempt to destroy the Tisza bridge at Cibakháza, but was successfully prevented by the troops of Major István Mesterházy and Major Károly Leiningen-Westerburg. For the attack, he also counted on Schlik's corps. The total number of the K.u.K. Army thus deployed, if Schlik managed to join his troops, reached 30,000 men and 165 guns. To secure the operation, the I. Corps had to attempt to destroy the bridge at Cibakháza, mentioned above, which was in the hands of the Hungarian troops.
The imperial army advanced in two columns, on the Pest-Miskolc road the Csorich Division and the artillery reserve, on the Jászberény-Árokszállás route the Schwarzenberg Division. In the meantime, Schlik retreated to Pétervására and awaited the arrival of the main army. Windisch-Grätz marched to Gyöngyös on 25 February and transferred his headquarters to this place. On this day, he finally met Schlik, with whom he discussed the future war plan. The corps commander's suggestion that he and his troops should join the main army at Kerecsend instead of Gyöngyös, marching through Verpelét, was accepted by the commander-in-chief. They agreed that Wrbna's two columns would advance from Gyöngyös and Árokszállás to Kápolna and Kál; Zeisberg's column was to advance from Tarnaörs towards Heves. Parrot's brigade, consisting of 3 battalions, 4 cavalry companies, and 1 battery, would march from Gyöngyöspata to Gyöngyös and put itself at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Wrbna; the rest of Schlik's corps had to advance along the Tarna valley to Verpelét and thus to come into contact with the main army. The next morning, Csorich's division had to cross the Tarna at Kápolna and Major General Edmund, Prince of Schwarzenberg's troops at Kál. The main force was to be covered from the south by Zeisberg's brigade. The two commanders did not expect that the Tarna line would be in Hungarian hands by the morning of the 26th. Windisch-Grätz had been informed that the enemy with about 40,000 men was in the vicinity of Mezőkövesd, Maklár and Eger, that Poroszló was held by them and that an enemy stronger column was advancing towards Heves.
According to Dembiński's orders, the Hungarian main army began to gather around Mezőkövesd. He held back one division of Répássy's corps to defend the Tiszafüred bridge, but ordered the other troops to the Tarna line. Görgei's forces, meanwhile, were slowly approaching from the Miskolc area. As Dembiński had originally planned the offensive against the Austrian main forces for early March, he was not worried about a slower-than-planned troop concentration. By 25 February, some of his units were already at the Tarna river, controlling the bridges over the stream. However, the operation did not run smoothly, the troops were not deployed according to their corps, with the divisions from different corps deployed side by side, disconnecting in this way the corps commanders from the command of their troops, which made cooperation between units difficult in the following battle, many units fighting on their own. So Dembiński also disrupted the Hungarian military organization that had been established by the beginning of February 1849, he moved the divisions under his command without the knowledge of the corps commanders, so the subordination relations were not clear and the sub-commanders did not know which orders were to be executed.
Opposing forces
The Hungarian army