The Battle of Isandlwana or Isandhlwana on 22 January 1879 was the second major encounter in the Anglo-Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom – the Battle of Nyezane having been fought and won earlier on the same day by Colonel Pearson's Coastal Column. Eleven days after the British invaded the Zulu Kingdom in Southern Africa, a Zulu force of some 20,000 warriors attacked a portion of the British main column consisting of approximately 1,800 British, colonial and native troops with approximately 350 civilians. The Zulus were equipped mainly with the traditional assegai iron spears and cow-hide shields, but also had a number of muskets and antiquated rifles.
The British and colonial troops were armed with the modern Martini–Henry breechloading rifle and two 7-pounder mountain guns deployed as field guns, as well as a Hale rocket battery. The Zulus had a vast disadvantage in weapons technology, but they greatly outnumbered the British and ultimately overwhelmed them, killing over 1,300 troops, including all those out on the forward firing line. The British were unprepared for the attack from the large Zulu contingent, which had moved quickly, and were attacked along the flanks by the Zulus using their traditional 'horns and chest of the buffalo' formation. The Zulu army suffered anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 killed.
The battle was a victory for the Zulus and caused the defeat of the first British invasion of Zululand. The British Army had suffered its worst defeat against an indigenous foe equipped with vastly inferior military technology. Isandlwana resulted in the British taking a much more aggressive approach in the Anglo-Zulu War, leading to a heavily reinforced second invasion, and the destruction of King Cetshwayo's hopes of a negotiated peace.
Background
Following the scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about the Confederation of Canada through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa and in 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme. Some of the obstacles to such a plan were the presence of the independent states of the South African Republic and the Kingdom of Zululand, both of which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.
Bartle Frere, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British government and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu king could not possibly comply. When the ultimatum expired a month later, Bartle Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with an invasion of Zululand, for which plans had already been made.
Prelude
Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 17,000 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the British and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal. Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of over 8,500 men, under his direct command. The centre column comprised No. 3 Column, commanded by Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn, and Colonel Anthony Durnford's No. 2 Column. Chelmsford moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.
The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, the 24th Regiment of Foot (which was subsequently renamed the South Wales Borderers). These were regarded as hardened and reliable troops. In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed. Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and two Hale rocket troughs. Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No. 3 Column, and over 3,800 men in the No. 2 Column that composed the main centre column. Colonel Anthony Durnford took charge of No. 2 Column with orders to stay on the defensive near the Middle Drift of the Tugela River. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season. This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.
The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger. It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties. Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide. The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi. However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack." The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortunately for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.
Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: "March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."
On 18 January, some 4,000 warriors, under the leadership of Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli, were detached from the main body to meet with Dabulamanzi kaMpande and attack Charles Pearson's No. 1 Column near Eshowe. The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda. The next day, the main force arrived and camped near Babanango Mountain, then moved the next day to a camp near Siphezi Mountain. Finally, on 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22 January. Under the command of Ntshigwayo kaMahole the Zulu army had reached its position in easy stages. It marched in two columns within sight of each other, but a few miles apart to prevent a surprise attack. They were preceded by a screening force of mounted scouts supported by parties of warriors 200–400 strong tasked with preventing the main columns from being sighted. The speed of the Zulu advance compared to the British was marked. The Zulu impi had advanced over 80 km (50 mi) in five days, while Chelmsford had only advanced slightly over 16 km (9.9 mi) in 10 days.
The British under Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January, but did not follow standing orders to entrench. No laager (circling of the wagons) was formed. Chelmsford did not see the need for one, stating, "It would take a week to make." But the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulus' capabilities. The experience of numerous colonial wars fought in Africa was that the massed firepower of relatively small bodies of professional European troops, armed with modern firearms and artillery and supplemented by local allies and levies, would march out to meet the natives whose poorly equipped armies would put up a fight but in the end would succumb. Chelmsford believed that a force of over 4,000, including 2,000 British infantry armed with Martini–Henry rifles, as well as artillery, had more than sufficient firepower to overwhelm any attack by Zulus armed only with spears, cowhide shields and a few firearms such as Brown Bess muskets. Indeed, with a British force of this size, it was the logistical arrangements which occupied Chelmsford's thoughts. Rather than any fear that the camp might be attacked, his main concern was managing the huge number of wagons and oxen required to support his forward advance.
Once he had established the camp at Isandlwana, Chelmsford sent out two battalions of the Natal Native Contingent to scout ahead. They skirmished with elements of a Zulu force which he believed to be the vanguard of the main enemy army. Such was his confidence in British military training and firepower that he divided his force, departing the camp at dawn on January 22 with approximately 2,800 soldiers—including half of the British infantry contingent, together with around 600 auxiliaries—to find the main Zulu force with the intention of bringing them to battle so as to achieve a decisive victory, and leaving the remaining 1,300 men of the No. 3 Column to guard the camp. It never occurred to him that the Zulus he saw were diverting him from their main force.
Chelmsford left behind approximately 600 British red coat line infantry – 450 men from five companies of the 1st Battalion and one company of 150 men from the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment of Foot, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine. Pulleine's orders were to defend the camp and wait for further instructions to support the general as and when called upon. Pulleine also had around 700 men composed of the Natal Native Contingent, local mounted irregulars, and other units. He also had two 7-pounder guns and two 9pr Hales rocket troughs, with around 70 men of the Royal Artillery. In total, over 1,300 men and two artillery guns of the No. 3 Column were left to defend the camp excluding civilian auxiliaries.
Pulleine, left in command of a rear position, was an administrator with no experience of front-line command on a campaign. Nevertheless, he commanded a strong force, particularly the six veteran regular infantry companies, which were experienced in colonial warfare. The mounted vedettes, cavalry scouts, patrolling some 11 km (6.8 mi) from camp reported at 7:00 am that groups of Zulus, numbering around 4,000 men, could be seen. Pulleine received further reports during the early morning, each of which noted movements, both large and small, of Zulus. There was speculation among the officers whether these troops were intending to march against Chelmsford's rear or towards the camp itself.
Around 10:30 am, Colonel Anthony Durnford, whose left arm was paralyzed from wounds sustained at Bushman's River Pass during the pursuit of Chief Langalibalele, arrived from Rorke's Drift with 500 men of the Natal Native Contingent and a rocket battery of the No. 2 Column to reinforce the camp at Isandlwana. This brought the issue of command to the fore because Durnford was senior and by tradition should have assumed command. However, he did not over-rule Pulleine's dispositions and after lunch he quickly decided to take the initiative and move forward to engage a Zulu force which Pulleine and Durnford judged to be moving against Chelmsford's rear. Durnford asked for a company of the 24th, but Pulleine was reluctant to agree since his orders had been specifically to defend the camp.
Chelmsford had underestimated the disciplined, well-led, well-motivated and confident Zulus. The failure to secure an effective defensive position, the poor intelligence on the location of the main Zulu army, Chelmsford's decision to split his force in half, and the Zulus' tactical exploitation of the terrain and the weaknesses in the British formation, all combined to prove catastrophic for the troops at Isandlwana. In contrast, the Zulus responded to the unexpected discovery of their camp with an immediate and spontaneous advance. Even though the indunas lost control over the advance, the warriors' training allowed the Zulu troops to form their standard attack formation on the run, with their battle line deployed in reverse of its intended order.
Battle
The Zulu Army was commanded by Umtwana (Prince) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Umtwana Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. The inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps after Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.