The Battle of Cowpens was a military engagement of the American Revolutionary War fought on January 17, 1781, near the town of Cowpens, South Carolina. An American army of nearly 2,000 regulars and militia under Brigadier general Daniel Morgan defeated a force of about 1,000 British and Loyalist troops commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Banastre Tarleton. It was the worst defeat suffered by the British in North America during the conflict following the 1777 Saratoga campaign.
The battle was part of the British "Southern strategy" in which British forces attempted to retake control over the American South under the belief that there was a significant Loyalist population there. However, such assumptions were mostly unfounded, and pro-Patriot sentiment surged in the South following the spread of news of the American victory at Cowpens. Tactically, the battle demonstrated that militia, when deployed properly, could defeat experienced regulars, something which American military and political leaders had previously considered impossible.
Morgan's militiamen disbanded after the battle, leaving 550 regulars under his command. British General Lord Cornwallis pursued Morgan during December 1780 and January 1781 with an army of 2,500 men. Morgan evaded Cornwallis and joined American General Nathanael Greene’s army near Greensboro, North Carolina, in early February, resulting in the Battle of Guilford Court House.
Background
On October 14, 1780, Continental Army commander General George Washington chose Nathanael Greene, a Rhode Island Quaker officer, to be commander of the Southern Department of the Continental forces. Greene's task was not an easy one. In 1780 the Carolinas had been the scene of a long string of disasters for the Continental Army, the worst being the capture of one American army under General Benjamin Lincoln in May 1780 at the siege of Charleston. The British then occupied the city, the largest in the South and the capital of South Carolina. Later that year, an American army commanded by General Horatio Gates was defeated at the Battle of Camden. A victory of Patriot militiamen over their Loyalist counterparts at the Battle of Kings Mountain on the northwest frontier in October had bought time, but the British still occupied most of South Carolina. When Greene took command, the southern army numbered 2,307 men on paper (1,482 present), of whom 949 were Continental regulars, mostly of the famous and highly trained "Maryland Line" regiment.
On December 3, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan reported for duty to Greene's headquarters at Charlotte, North Carolina. At the start of the American Revolution, Morgan—whose military experience dated to the French and Indian War (1754–1763)—had served at the siege of Boston in 1775. Later he participated in the 1775 invasion of Canada and its climactic battle, the Battle of Quebec. That battle ended in defeat and Morgan's capture by the British. Morgan was exchanged in January 1777 and placed by Washington in command of a picked force of 500 trained riflemen, known as Morgan's Riflemen. Morgan and his men played a key role in the 1777 victory at Saratoga, which proved to be a turning point of the entire war. Bitter after being passed over for promotion and plagued by severe attacks of sciatica, Morgan left the army in 1779. A year later, he was promoted to brigadier general and returned to service in the Southern Department.
Greene decided that his weak army could not meet the British in a stand-up fight. He made the unconventional decision to divide his army, sending a detachment west of the Catawba River to raise the morale of the locals and find supplies beyond the limited amounts available around Charlotte. Greene gave Morgan command of this wing and instructed him to join with the militia west of the Catawba and take command of them. Morgan headed west on December 21, charged with taking position between the Broad and Pacolet rivers and protecting the civilians in that area. He had 600 men, some 400 of whom were Continentals, mostly from Delaware and Maryland. The rest were Virginia militia who had experience as Continentals. By Christmas Day, Morgan had reached the Pacolet. He was joined by 60 more South Carolina militiamen led by the experienced guerrilla partisan Andrew Pickens. Other militia from Georgia and the Carolinas joined Morgan's camp.
Meanwhile, Lord Cornwallis was planning to return to North Carolina and conduct the invasion that he had postponed after the defeat at Kings Mountain. Morgan's force represented a threat to his left. Additionally, Cornwallis received incorrect intelligence claiming that Morgan was going to attack the important British fort of American Loyalists at Ninety Six, South Carolina. Seeking to save the fort and defeat Morgan's command, Cornwallis on January 1, 1781, with a follow-up message on January 2 ordered cavalry (dragoons) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to the west.
Tarleton had enjoyed a spectacular career in his service with the British in the colonies. In December 1776, he and a small party surprised and captured American General Charles Lee in New Jersey. He served with distinction at the siege of Charleston and the Battle of Camden. Commanding the British Legion—a mixed infantry/cavalry force composed of American Loyalists who constituted some of the best British troops in the Carolinas—Tarleton won victories at Monck's Corner and Fishing Creek. He became infamous among colonists after his victory at the Battle of Waxhaws, where his men were accused of killing American soldiers after they had surrendered. Fleeing Patriots believed at least one soldier who had surrendered picked up a gun and shot at Tarleton. Tarleton wrote in his 1781 history that his horse had been shot from under him during the initial charge and his men, thinking him murdered, attacked relentlessly until brought under control.
Tarleton and the Legion marched to Ninety Six. After learning Morgan was not there, Tarleton asked for reinforcements of British regulars, which Cornwallis sent. Tarleton set out with his enlarged command to drive Morgan across the Broad River. On January 12 he received accurate news of Morgan's location and continued with hard marching, building boats to cross rivers that were flooding with winter rains. Receiving word that Tarleton was in hot pursuit, Morgan retreated north to avoid being trapped between Tarleton and Cornwallis.
By the afternoon of January 16, Morgan was approaching the Broad River, which was high with flood waters and reported difficult to cross. He knew Tarleton was close behind. By nightfall, he had reached a place called locally "Hannah's Cowpens," a well-known grazing area for local cattle. Pickens, who had been patrolling, arrived that night to join Morgan with his large body of irregular militia. Morgan decided to stand and fight rather than continue to retreat and risk being caught by Tarleton while fording the Broad. Learning of Morgan's location, Tarleton pushed his troops, marching at 3 a.m. instead of camping for the night.
Prelude
Continental force
The size of the American force at Cowpens remains in dispute. Morgan claims in his official report to have had about 800 men at Cowpens, which is substantially supported by historian John Buchanan whose estimate is between 800 and 1,000 men. In contrast, historian Lawrence E. Babits in his detailed study of the battle offers an interesting alternative estimate contending that the strength of Morgan's command on the day of the battle was closer to 1,900, composed of:
- A battalion of Continental infantry under Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard of Baltimore, with one company from Delaware ("Delaware Line"), one from Virginia, and three from the famous stalwart "Maryland Line" regiment, each with a strength of 60 men (300)
- A company of Virginia state militia troops under Captain John Lawson (75)
- A company of South Carolina state troops under Captain Joseph Pickens (60)
- A small company of North Carolina state troops under Captain Henry Connelly (number not given)
- A Virginia militia battalion under Frank Triplett (160)
- Three companies of Virginia militia under Major David Campbell (50)
- A battalion of North Carolina militia under Colonel Joseph McDowell (260–285)
- A brigade of four battalions of South Carolina militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens, comprising a three-company battalion of the Spartan Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Roebuck, a four-company battalion of the Spartan Regiment under Colonel John Thomas, five companies of the Little River Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Hayes, and seven companies of the Fair Forest Regiment under Colonel Thomas Brandon. Babits states that this battalion "ranged in size from 120 to more than 250 men." If Roebuck's three companies numbered 120 and Brandon's seven companies numbered 250, then Thomas's four companies probably numbered about 160 and Hayes's five companies about 200 for a total of 730.
- Three small companies of Georgia militia commanded by Major Cunningham who numbered 55
- A detachment of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington (82), who was a second cousin of George Washington.
- Detachments of state dragoons from North Carolina and Virginia (30)
- A detachment of South Carolina state dragoons, with a few mounted Georgians, commanded by Major James McCall (25)
- A company of newly raised volunteers from the local South Carolina militia commanded by Major Benjamin Jolly (45)
Babits's figures can be summarized as follows: 82 Continental light dragoons, 55 state dragoons, 45 militia dragoons, 300 Continental infantry, about 150 state infantry, and 1,255–1,280 militia infantry for a total of 1,887–1,912 officers and men. Broken down by state, there were about 855 South Carolinians, 442 Virginians, 290–315 North Carolinians, 180 Marylanders, 60 Georgians, and 60 Delawareans.
Morgan's forces were strengthened by these seasoned troops. His Continentals were veterans (Marylanders from the 1776 Battle of Brooklyn), as were many of his militia which included some Overmountain Men who had fought at the Battle of Musgrove Mill and the Battle of Kings Mountain. British officers had a low opinion of militia. "Tarleton, who had some idea as to the composition of [Morgan’s] forces, was eager to take them on."
British force
Tarleton's force included:
In total the British force consisted of over 1,150 officers and other ranks.
Broken down by troop classification, Tarleton had 300 cavalrymen, 553 British regulars, 231 Loyalist regulars, 24 artillerymen, and 50 irregulars. Nearly half of his men, 481 out of 1,158, were Loyalists. Tarleton's British regulars from the 17th Light Dragoons, 7th, 16th, and 71st Regiments of Foot and Royal Artillery were reliable and seasoned soldiers. Tarleton's own unit, the Loyalist British Legion, had established a fierce reputation as formidable pursuers, being used to great effect at Waxhaws and Camden, but they had an uncertain reputation when facing determined opposition.
Morgan's plan
Morgan turned to his advantage the terrain of Cowpens, the varying reliability of his troops, his expectations of his opponent, and the time available before Tarleton's arrival. He knew that untrained militiamen, which comprised a large portion of his force, were generally unreliable in a pitched battle. In the past, they had routed at the first hint of defeat and abandoned the regulars. For instance, the Battle of Camden had ended in disaster when the militia, which comprised half of the American force, broke and ran as soon as the fighting started, leaving the American flank exposed. To eliminate that possibility, he defied convention by placing his army between the Broad and Pacolet rivers, thus making escape impossible if the army was routed. Selecting a low hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks exposed to his opponent. With a ravine on their right flank and a creek on their left flank, Morgan reasoned his forces were sufficiently protected against possible British flanking maneuvers at the beginning of the battle.