The Battle of Cortenuova (sometimes spelled Cortenova) was fought on 27 November 1237 between the army of Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen and the forces of the Second Lombard League, during the prolonged conflict conventionally associated with the Guelphs and Ghibellines Wars. It ended in a crushing imperial victory and the destruction of the League's field army. One of the largest and bloodiest pitched battles of thirteenth-century Italy, Cortenuova represented the greatest battlefield success of Frederick's reign and transformed the political balance of northern Italy.
The battle came at the culmination of a decade of major Hohenstaufen successes. Frederick had achieved the diplomatic recovery of the city of Jerusalem during the Sixth Crusade, reversed papal incursions against his rule in southern Italy in the War of the Keys, consolidated his highly centralized rule in the Kingdom of Sicily, defeated the rebellion of his son Henry (VII), restored royal authority in Germany and reconciled the Welfs to Hohenstaufen power, acquired direct authority in Austria and secured the election of his son Conrad as king of the Romans. Already the preeminent secular ruler of western Europe, after Cortenuova his position appeared still more commanding. The principal military coalition opposing him in northern Italy collapsed, cities submitted or opened negotiations, and the imperial chancery broadcast his triumph throughout Christendom.
The victory was also a major episode in the developing confrontation between emperor and papacy. The Lombard communes represented the principal political and military barrier to the extension of effective imperial authority across northern Italy, while Pope Gregory IX increasingly regarded their survival as essential to the balance of power on the peninsula. The captured Milanese Carroccio, ultimately displayed on the Capitoline Hill in Rome as a trophy of imperial victory, gave Cortenuova a symbolic resonance far beyond Lombardy and associated Frederick's triumph with the political imagery of ancient Rome.
Cortenuova was especially striking because the League had committed a large part of its available military strength to the campaign. Its defeat therefore reached beyond the losses of a single day: commanders and nobles were killed or captured, the principal communal field army disintegrated and Milan lost the ceremonial object around which the political identity of its army had been visibly organized. Yet the result also illustrates the distinction between battlefield destruction and political submission characteristic of warfare in communal Italy. Even a defeat on this scale did not extinguish Milan's institutional, demographic and financial capacity to continue resistance. The battle created an extraordinary opportunity for Frederick, but converting that opportunity into a lasting constitutional settlement required something different from tactical victory alone.
Background
Imperial recovery and renewed conflict
In 1235 Frederick returned to Germany to suppress the rebellion of his son Henry (VII), restore political stability and strengthen the position of the Hohenstaufen monarchy north of the Alps. In the autumn of that year he also determined to resume the struggle against the Lombard communes which, supported diplomatically by Gregory IX, continued to contest the effective exercise of imperial authority in northern Italy. The fundamental dispute concerned both the political autonomy acquired by the communes and the extent to which the rights recognized in the Peace of Constance could coexist with Frederick's conception of imperial jurisdiction. Papal mediation continued throughout 1236 and 1237, but repeated negotiations failed to reconcile the two sides.
The strategic circumstances differed substantially from those faced by Frederick's grandfather during the First Lombard League. Frederick II could draw upon the fiscal and military resources of the Kingdom of Sicily while simultaneously mobilising German princes and extensive networks of Ghibelline support throughout northern and central Italy. The communes had also grown richer and more populous during the intervening decades, but Milan's regional power remained sufficiently threatening to ensure that numerous Italian cities considered imperial intervention useful for their own purposes. The conflict consequently remained as much a struggle among Italian political communities as one between emperor and communes.
Frederick entered northern Italy in 1236 and, with the assistance of Ezzelino III da Romano and other Ghibelline leaders, rapidly attacked the League's eastern network. Vicenza was stormed and sacked. Satisfied with the immediate results, Frederick temporarily returned north of the Alps, leaving Hermann von Salza, Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, deeply involved in negotiations between emperor, pope and communes. By the following year the emperor had secured Conrad's election in Germany and assembled fresh military forces. He left Germany in September 1237 for what proved to be the final time. The League remained active during Frederick's absence. Several communes adopted policies that sharpened the confrontation, while Piacenza moved into the anti-imperial camp. Brescia occupied an especially important strategic position between the imperial and League zones, and the routes between the Serio and Oglio became central to the coming campaign. Cortenuova itself lay along the communications linking Milan and Brescia, giving apparently local strongholds and river crossings significance within the wider operational contest.
Campaign of 1237
Around 2,000 German knights accompanied Frederick across the Alps. Near Verona and Mantua they were joined by troops collected from Tuscany and the Kingdom of Sicily under Gebhard of Arnstein, including a conspicuous contingent of Muslim archers from Lucera. Sources give very high estimates for these Saracen troops, sometimes 7,000 or more. Ezzelino contributed approximately 500 cavalry from the Veneto, while Cremona, Parma, Pavia, Modena, Reggio and other imperial allies supplied cavalry and infantry. At the height of the campaign Frederick's total manoeuvre force may have reached or exceeded 20,000 men. The imperial advance immediately altered the political balance. Mantua chose submission rather than face destruction and received comparatively generous terms. Frederick then turned against Brescia. The important fortified settlement of Montichiari resisted for almost three weeks before capitulating on 21 October. Its roughly 1,500 defenders were captured and the town was burned, opening the approaches to Brescia.
The sequence revealed the breadth of Frederick's operational system. German cavalry supplied shock power, troops from the Regno supplied both cavalry and missile forces, and loyal communes furnished infantry, local knowledge, food and secure bases. This diversity allowed the imperial army to perform tasks ranging from rapid movement and raiding to the reduction of fortified positions. It also meant that Frederick was conducting war through an imperial coalition rather than a homogeneous "German" host. The threat produced an unusually large League mobilization. Milan supplied the core of the army and brought its carroccio, the ceremonial war wagon that functioned as command post, rallying point and embodiment of the commune itself. Piacenza contributed roughly 1,000 cavalry, while additional troops arrived from Alessandria, Vercelli, Novara, Como, Crema and Lodi. The League army probably numbered around 15,000 men, perhaps one third mounted. Its commander was Pietro Tiepolo, podestà of Milan and son of the Venetian doge.
Stalemate on the Oglio
The League occupied a carefully selected position near Manerbio. Rivers, marshes and the autumn rains created natural obstacles that made attack difficult and reduced the effectiveness of Frederick's cavalry. For several weeks the armies faced each other without decisive action as supplies dwindled and the terrain deteriorated. On 23 November Frederick began withdrawing across the Oglio, sending much of his infantry and baggage toward Cremona while retaining around Soncino a mobile force of German and southern cavalry, Pavians, Saracen archers and selected Cremonese infantry. The League concluded that the campaign was over and began its own march toward winter quarters.
The apparent stalemate was conditioned heavily by geography. The Oglio and the waterlogged ground acted almost as field fortifications, making aggressive movement difficult for both armies. The League had therefore succeeded in temporarily neutralising much of the offensive advantage created by Frederick's larger and more varied host. The result was strategically satisfactory so long as the League remained concentrated behind these obstacles. The danger came when that concentration dissolved. Once the imperial army appeared to be retiring toward winter quarters, parts of the League's communal levy were released and the remaining column began moving north and west. Frederick retained enough mobile forces at Soncino to exploit any opening. The decision placed the contest increasingly in the hands of intelligence, reconnaissance and speed rather than simple numerical superiority.
Battle
Movement toward Cortenuova
The Lombard column moved west in difficult conditions. Heavy rain had turned the roads into mud, while thousands of soldiers, wagons, pack animals and the oxen drawing the carroccio had to pass through a limited number of crossings over the Oglio. The movement became progressively stretched and disorganized. The main body advanced toward Cortenuova while the baggage train, accompanied by Milanese and Piacentine escorts, remained several kilometres behind.
Frederick had maintained an extensive intelligence network throughout the campaign. Imperial supporters in Brescia reported League movements and Bergamese patrols shadowed the retreat. Once the Lombard column was identified between Cortenuova and the river, smoke signals were transmitted from Cividate al Piano through a chain of towers toward Soncino. Couriers then informed the emperor that the enemy was divided and vulnerable. Imperial propaganda subsequently portrayed the whole operation as a calculated trap, although the precise degree of premeditation is uncertain. Frederick's own early description called the opportunity both accidental and fortunate. What is clear is that he recognized the advantage immediately, concentrated the troops available to him and moved rapidly against the exposed League army.
The coordination with Bergamese forces was particularly effective. They were instructed to observe the League crossing rather than reveal themselves prematurely, and the signal was sent only after a large part of the communal army had committed itself to the route toward Cortenuova. The League, meanwhile, remained unaware that a substantial imperial force had halted at Soncino and was shadowing its movement from the opposite side of the Oglio. Its commanders had correctly used terrain to frustrate Frederick during the previous fortnight but now lost the informational advantage that had made the defensive posture effective.
Opening engagement
The battlefield stretched for more than four kilometres from the Oglio to the castle of Cortenuova. The first imperial attack fell upon the League's rearguard and baggage escort. Although surprised and outnumbered, the Milanese and Piacentines resisted fiercely for approximately an hour. Both sides suffered heavy losses before the defenders were forced backward, some fleeing while others joined the main League force concentrated around the carroccio.
The initial collision may not have been planned as the beginning of the general battle. The imperial advance force had been sent rapidly forward to close on the enemy, but encountered Lombard troops before the principal formations were fully deployed. The speed with which the local success was exploited was therefore crucial. Frederick pressed the main army forward rather than allowing the League time to reorganise its dispersed column, converting an encounter into a major engagement. By the time Frederick reached the principal battlefield, Tiepolo had established a broad defensive line near Cortenuova. The carroccio stood at its centre, while the communal infantry formed several close ranks protected by shields and presenting a dense wall of spears. Cavalry guarded the exposed flank and could launch counterattacks against weakened imperial formations. The position was strengthened by a shallow ditch.
Battle around the Carroccio
Frederick probably had more than 10,000 men available for the decisive engagement, making his army one of the largest and most formidable imperial forces fielded in a pitched battle in medieval Italy. Its nucleus consisted of approximately 3,000 German knights, reinforced by perhaps 2,000 or more Italian and southern cavalry. The army also contained large numbers of Saracen archers, selected Cremonese infantry armed with long-handled axes and troops from Pavia, the Veneto and the Kingdom of Sicily. The variety of these forces became one of the decisive features of the battle. The compact League infantry formation had repeatedly demonstrated that cavalry alone could fail against disciplined communal foot soldiers, most famously at the Battle of Legnano in 1176. Frederick therefore subjected the Lombard line to coordinated pressure. Muslim archers weakened the lightly armoured infantry with sustained missile fire; Cremonese assault troops attacked the defensive formation; and German, Pavese and southern cavalry launched repeated charges against increasingly strained sectors. The emperor's handling of the battle displayed considerable tactical flexibility: rather than merely relying upon the shock power of his mounted elite, he combined the distinct capabilities of cavalry, infantry and missile troops against the specific strengths of the communal formation.