The Battle of Adwa was the climactic battle of the First Italo-Ethiopian War. It was fought on 1 March 1896, near the town of Adwa between the Ethiopian Empire under Emperor Menelik II and an Italian colonial force led by General Oreste Baratieri.
Following a dispute over the interpretation of the Treaty of Wuchale, Italy attempted to force Ethiopia to abide by the Italian version of the treaty and impose a protectorate over Ethiopia. In response, Emperor Menelik II mobilized a massive army, with estimates ranging from 73,000 to over 100,000 men, mostly equipped with modern rifles imported from France and Russia. Facing them was a much smaller Italian colonial force under General Oreste Baratieri, which was unfamiliar with the terrain and hampered by poor reconnaissance.
Despite concerns about the size and strength of the Ethiopian forces, Baratieri, under pressure from Rome to act decisively, decided to initiate a surprise attack on the Ethiopians camped near Adwa. The Italian command advanced into difficult terrain, dividing their forces into separate columns that quickly became isolated from one another. The Ethiopians launched coordinated attacks on the dispersed Italian brigades. While the Italians initially used their artillery to slow the Ethiopian advance, their defensive positions were soon overwhelmed by sustained and numerically superior Ethiopian assaults.
The battle ended in a decisive Ethiopian victory, with over 6,000 Italian and colonial troops killed, and around 3,800 captured. Ethiopian casualties are estimated between 4,000 to 7,000 killed, and 6,000 to 10,000 wounded. The defeat forced Italy to recognize Ethiopia's sovereignty in the Treaty of Addis Ababa. Adwa resulted in the fall of the government of Francesco Crispi and secured de jure Ethiopian sovereignty until the Second Italo-Ethiopian War forty years later.
Historians often place Adwa among the most notable military reverses suffered by European powers during the Scramble for Africa. By the end of the 19th century, Ethiopia remained one of the few independent countries in Africa and the only one to owe its independence to a military victory.
Background
In 1889, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with King Menelik of Shewa. The treaty, signed after the Italian occupation of Eritrea, recognized Italy's claim over the coastal colony. In it, Italy also promised to provide financial assistance and military supplies. A dispute later arose over the interpretation of the two versions of the document. In the Italian-language version, the disputed Article 17 of the treaty stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia was obliged to conduct all foreign affairs through Italian authorities, effectively making Ethiopia a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy. The Amharic version of the article stated that the Emperor could use the good offices of the Kingdom of Italy in his relations with foreign nations if he wished. The Italian diplomats claimed that the original Amharic text included the clause and that Menelik II knowingly signed a modified copy of the Treaty.
During the 1890-96 period, the Italians pursued a twofold strategy to advance their imperial goals in Ethiopia. The first dimension, advocated mainly by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and nicknamed "politica scioana", was diplomatic, by attempting to persuade Menelik into accepting their interpretation of Article 17 and mobilising other European powers to exert pressure on the Ethiopian monarch. The second dimension, nicknamed "politica tigrigna" and pursued mostly by the Ministry of Colonies and the government of Eritrea, focused on subversive activities in Tigray, exploiting the centrifugal tendencies of provincial leaderships in Tigray and the Tigrayan resentment against the new Shewan emperor Menelik II in the hope of dismembering the country. Menelik successfully resisted both strategies. By June 1894, even the leading figures of Tigray, headed by Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula, traveled to Addis Ababa to pay homage to the Emperor, completing his political consolidation before the military confrontation.
The Italian government decided on a military solution to force Ethiopia to abide by the Italian version of the treaty. As a result, Italy and Ethiopia came into confrontation, in what was later to be known as the First Italo-Ethiopian War. In December 1894, Bahta Hagos led a rebellion against the Italians in Akele Guzai, in what was then Italian controlled Eritrea. Units of Italian General Oreste Baratieri's army under Major Pietro Toselli crushed the rebellion and killed Bahta. In January 1895, Baratieri's army defeated Ras Mengesha Yohannes in the Battle of Coatit, forcing Mengesha to retreat further south.
By late 1895, Italian forces had advanced deep into Ethiopian territory and occupied much of Tigray. In September 1895, Menelik issued an awaj, a formal call to arms addressed to the entire Ethiopian population, mobilising the provincial forces that would form the army at Adwa. On 7 December 1895, Ras Makonnen Wolde Mikael, Fitawrari Gebeyehu and Ras Mengesha Yohannes commanding a larger Ethiopian group of Menelik's vanguard annihilated a small Italian unit at the Battle of Amba Alagi. The Italians were then forced to withdraw to more defensible positions in Tigray Province, where the two main armies faced each other. By late February 1896, supplies on both sides were running low. General Oreste Baratieri, commander of the Italian forces, knew the Ethiopian forces had been living off the land, and once the supplies of the local peasants were exhausted, Emperor Menelik II's army would begin to melt away. However, the Italian government insisted that General Baratieri act. This decision to attack rather than hold position stood in contrast to the successful tactics of General Alessandro Asinari di San Marzano, who in late March 1888 had entrenched Italian forces near Sahati and forced Emperor Yohannes IV to withdraw from Eritrea after the Ethiopian army exhausted its supplies. Baratieri knew Menelik was logistically far better prepared than Yohannes had been, while his own army was too far from Massawa to be conveniently resupplied as San Marzano had been.
The Italian journalist Adolfo Rossi, who undertook several reporting missions in the region for Corriere della Sera and witnessed major defeats such as the massacre at Amba Alagi and the Siege of Mekelle (Macallè in Italian) in January 1896, was an outspoken critic of the military-led colonial administration and its expansion into sacred Abyssinian territory – warning that it would provoke a backlash, which was soon realized through Emperor Menelik's counteroffensive. He condemned the colonial leadership as overly militaristic, driven by a thirst for medals and glory, and warned that Italian forces were overstretched, tasked with controlling an excessively large territory with too few men and inadequate logistical support. Rossi remained with General Baratieri until mid-February but was expelled just days before the Italian defeat at Adwa for his "unpatriotic" reporting, his criticism of military decisions, and his repeated warnings against engaging Menelik's vastly superior army.
On the evening of 29 February, Baratieri, about to be replaced by a new governor, General Baldissera, met with his generals Matteo Albertone, Giuseppe Arimondi, Vittorio Dabormida, and Giuseppe Ellena, concerning their next steps. He opened the meeting on a negative note, revealing to his brigadiers that provisions would be exhausted in less than five days, and suggested retreating, perhaps as far back as Asmara. His subordinates argued forcefully for an attack, insisting that to retreat at this point would only worsen the poor morale. Dabormida exclaimed, "Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat." Baratieri delayed making a decision for a few more hours, claiming that he needed to wait for some last-minute intelligence, but in the end announced that the attack would start the next morning at 9:00am. His troops began their march to their starting positions shortly after midnight.
Order of battle
Ethiopian forces
- Shewa; Negus Negasti Menelik II: 25,000 rifles / 3,000 horses / 32 guns
- Semien; Itaghiè Taytu: 3,000 rifles / 600 horses / 4 guns
- Gojjam; Negus Tekle Haymanot: 5,000 rifles
- Harar; Ras Makonnen: 15,000 rifles
- Tigray; Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula: 12,000 rifles / 6 guns
- Wollo; Ras Mikael: 6,000 rifles / 5,000 horses
- Gondar; Ras Olié: 8,000 rifles
- Lasta; Wagshum Guangul: 6,000 rifles
- In addition there were ~20,000 spearmen and swordsmen as well as an unknown number of armed peasants.
Estimates for the Ethiopian forces under Menelik range from a low of 73,000 to a high of over 100,000 outnumbering the Italians by an estimated five times. The forces were divided among Emperor Menelik, Empress Taytu Betul, Ras Welle Betul, Ras Mengesha Atikem, Ras Mengesha Yohannes, Ras Alula Engida (Abba Nega), Ras Mikael of Wollo, Ras Makonnen Wolde Mikael, Fitawrari Habte Giyorgis, Fitawrari Gebeyyehu, and Negus Tekle Haymanot Tessemma.
Pétridè, as well as Pankhurst, with slight variations, break the troop numbers down (over 100,000 by their estimates) as follows: 35,000 infantry (25,000 riflemen and 10,000 spearmen) and 8,000 cavalry under Emperor Menelik; 5,000 infantry under Empress Taytu; 8,000 infantry (6,000 riflemen and 2,000 spearmen) under Ras Wale; 8,000 infantry (5,000 riflemen and 3,000 spearmen) under Ras Mengesha Atikem, 12,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula Engida; 6,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 5,000 Oromo cavalry under Ras Mikael of Wollo; 15,000 riflemen under Ras Makonnen; 8,000 infantry under Fitawrari Gebeyyehu Gora; 5,000 riflemen, 5,000 spearmen, and 3,000 cavalry under Negus Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam.
The armies were followed by a similar number of camp followers who supplied the army, as had been done for centuries. Most of the army consisted of riflemen, a significant percentage of whom were in Menelik's reserve. There were also a significant number of cavalry and infantry only armed with lances, the latter referred to as "lancer servants".
Italian forces
Immediately before the battle of Adwa, the Italian army in East Africa numbered around 29,700 men. However, as Harold Marcus notes, "several thousand" soldiers were needed in support roles and to guard the lines of communication to the rear. He accordingly estimates that the Italian force at Adwa consisted of just 14,519 effective combat troops. In contrast, David Levering Lewis estimates that the Italian army consisted of four brigades, totaling 17,770 troops with fifty-six artillery pieces. The Italian force was organized into four brigades. General Matteo Albertone's left column comprised four indigenous battalions and four artillery batteries. General Giuseppe Arimondi's centre column consisted of five white battalions, one indigenous battalion and two batteries. General Vittorio Dabormida's right column included six white battalions, four militia battalions and two batteries. In reserve, General Giuseppe Ellena commanded six white battalions, one indigenous battalion and two rapid-fire batteries.
Unlike most other European armies during the Scramble for Africa, the Italian army at Adwa primarily consisted of white European troops. While these included elite Bersaglieri and Alpini units, a large proportion of the troops were inexperienced conscripts recently drafted from metropolitan regiments in Italy into newly formed "d'Africa" battalions for service in Africa. Additionally, a limited number of troops were from the Cacciatori d'Africa; units permanently serving in Africa and in part recruited from Italian settlers.
According to historian Chris Prouty:
They [the Italians] had inadequate maps, old-model guns, poor communication equipment and inferior footgear for the rocky ground. (The newer Carcano Model 91 rifles were not issued because Baratieri, under constraints to be economical, wanted to use up the old cartridges). Morale was low as the veterans were homesick and the newcomers were too inexperienced to have any esprit de corps. There was a shortage of mules and saddles.
The Italian operational corps in Eritrea was under the command of General Oreste Baratieri. The chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Gioacchino Valenzano.