The Aceh War (Indonesian: Perang Aceh; Acehnese: Prang Acèh; 1873–1904), was an armed military conflict between the Sultanate of Aceh and the Kingdom of the Netherlands which was triggered by discussions between representatives of Aceh and the United States in Singapore during early 1873. The war was part of a series of conflicts in the late 19th century that consolidated Dutch rule over modern-day Indonesia.
The campaign drew controversy in the Netherlands and Aceh as photographs and accounts of the death toll were reported. In 1904, the Sultanate of Aceh surrendered, though guerilla resistance would continue for some time after.
Background
For much of the 19th century, Aceh's independence had been guaranteed by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. During the 1820s, Aceh became a regional political and commercial power, supplying half of the world's pepper, which increased the revenues and influence of local feudal rajas. Growing European and American demand for pepper led to a series of diplomatic skirmishes between the British, French and Americans. During the reign of Sultan Alauddin Ibrahim Mansur Syah (1838–1870), the Aceh Sultanate brought the regional rajas under its control and extended its domain over the east coast. However, this southward trend clashed with the northwards expansion of Dutch colonialism in Sumatra.
Following the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal and changing shipping routes, the British and Dutch signed the 1871 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Sumatra which ended British territorial claims to Sumatra, allowing the Dutch a free hand within their sphere of influence in Maritime Southeast Asia while handing them the responsibility to check piracy. In return, Britain gained control of the Dutch Gold Coast in Africa and equal commercial rights in Siak. Dutch territorial ambitions in Aceh were fuelled by a desire to exploit its natural resources, especially black pepper and oil, and to eliminate an independent native state player. The Dutch also sought to ward off rival colonial powers that had ambitions in Southeast Asia, particularly the British and the French.
Combat operations
Strategies
The Dutch tried several strategies over the course of the war; single rapid attacks in 1873 failed, which then led them to pursue a naval blockade, reconciliation efforts, concentration within a line of forts, and finally passive containment. This all had scant success. The operations costs were 15 to 20 million guilders a year, which nearly bankrupted the colonial government.
First Dutch offensive
In 1873, negotiations took place in Singapore between representatives of the Aceh Sultanate and the local American Consul over a potential bilateral treaty. The Dutch saw this as a violation of a prior agreement with the British in 1871 and used this as an opportunity to annex Aceh militarily. An expedition under Major General Johan Harmen Rudolf Köhler was sent out on 26 March 1873, which bombarded the capital Banda Aceh and was able to occupy most of the coastal areas by April. It was the intention of the Dutch to attack and take the Sultan's palace, which would also lead to the occupation of the entire country. The Sultan requested and possibly received military aid from Italy and the United Kingdom in Singapore. In any case the Aceh army was rapidly modernised and enlarged with figures ranging from 10,000 to 100,000. Underestimating the military abilities of the Acehnese, the Dutch made some tactical errors and sustained losses including the deaths of Köhler and 80 troops. These defeats undermined Dutch morale and prestige.
After deciding to retreat, the Dutch imposed a naval blockade of Aceh. In an attempt to preserve Aceh's independence, Sultan Mahmud appealed to the other Western powers and the Ottoman Empire for direct help but to little avail. While the American Consul was sympathetic, the American government remained neutral. Due to its weak position in the international political stage, the Ottoman Empire was impotent and the British refused to intervene due to their relations with the Dutch. Only the French agreed to respond to Mahmud's appeal.
Second Dutch offensive
In November 1873, a second expedition consisting of 8,500 troops, 4,300 servants and coolies, and another reserve of 1,500 troops was added by General Jan van Swieten to be dispatched to Aceh. The invasion coincided with a cholera outbreak which killed thousands on both sides, the Dutch losing 150 every month while besieged in Banda Aceh. By January 1874, deteriorating conditions forced Sultan Mahmud Syah and his followers to abandon Banda Aceh and retreat to the interior. Meanwhile, Dutch forces occupied the capital and captured the symbolically important dalam (sultan's palace), leading the Dutch to believe that they had won. The Dutch occupiers then abolished the Acehnese Sultanate and declared Aceh to be annexed to the Dutch East Indies proper.
Following Mahmud's death from cholera, the Acehnese proclaimed a young grandson of Alauddin Ibrahim Mansur Syah, named Tuanku Muhammad Daud, as Alauddin Muhammad Da'ud Syah II (r. 1875–1903) and continued their struggle in the hills and jungle territory for ten years, with heavy casualties on both sides. Around 1880 the Dutch strategy changed, and rather than continuing the war, they now concentrated on defending areas they already controlled, which were mostly limited to the capital city, and the harbour town of Ulee Lheue. Dutch naval blockades succeeded in forcing the uleebelang or secular chiefs to sign treaties that extended Dutch control along the coastal regions. However, the uleebelang then used their newly restored revenues to finance the Acehnese resistance forces. By 1881, the Dutch had unilaterally declared the war over.
The Dutch intervention in Aceh cost the lives of thousands of troops and was a severe drain on the colonial government's financial expenditure. On 13 October 1880 the colonial government declared the war was over and installed a civilian government, but continued spending heavily to maintain control over the areas it occupied. In an attempt to win the support of the local Acehnese, the Dutch rebuilt the Masjid Raya Baiturrahman or Great Mosque in Banda Aceh as a gesture of reconciliation.
Holy war
War began again in 1883, when the British ship Nisero was stranded in Aceh, in an area where the Dutch had little influence. A local leader asked for ransom from both the Dutch and the British, and under British pressure the Dutch were forced to attempt to liberate the sailors. After a failed Dutch attempt to rescue the hostages, where the local leader Teuku Umar was asked for help but he refused, the Dutch together with the British invaded the territory. The Sultan gave up the hostages, and received a large amount of cash in exchange.
The Dutch Minister of War August Willem Philip Weitzel again declared open war on Aceh, and warfare continued with little success, as before. Facing a technologically superior foe, the Acehnese resorted to guerrilla warfare, particularly traps and ambushes. Dutch troops retaliated by wiping out entire villages and murdering both prisoners and civilians. By the mid-1880s, the costs of the war borne by the Dutch was so large that part of the colonial budget had to be shifted, local taxes were increased and a Dutch retrenchment was ordered which had the effect of much of the countryside being retaken by the Acehnese. In 1884, the Dutch responded by withdrawing all their forces in Aceh into a fortified line around Banda Aceh. The Dutch now also tried to enlist local leaders: the aforementioned Umar was bought with cash, opium, and weapons. Umar received the title panglima prang besar (lit. 'great war commander'). However, Umar instead called himself Teuku Djohan Pahlawan (lit. 'Johan the Heroic').
On 1 January 1894 Umar even received Dutch aid to build an army. However, two years later Umar attacked the Dutch with his new army, rather than aiding the Dutch in subjugating inner Aceh. This is recorded in Dutch history as "Het verraad van Teukoe Oemar" (The Treason of Teuku Umar). From the mid-1880s, the Acehnese military leadership was dominated by religious ulema, including Teungku Chik di Tiro (Muhammad Saman), who propagated the concept of a "holy war" (prang sabi in Acehnese) through sermons and texts known as hikayat or poetic tales. Acehnese fighters viewed themselves as religious martyrs fighting "infidel invaders". By this stage, the Aceh War was being used as a symbol of Muslim resistance to Western imperialism.
In 1892 and 1893 Aceh remained independent, despite the Dutch efforts. Major J. B. van Heutsz, a colonial military leader, then wrote a series of articles on Aceh. He was supported by Dr. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje of Leiden University, then the leading Dutch expert on Islam. Hurgronje managed to get the confidence of many Aceh leaders and gathered valuable intelligence for the Dutch government on the activities of Indonesian Hajj pilgrims. His works remained an official secret for many years. In Hurgronje's analysis of Acehnese society, he minimised the role of the Sultan and argued that attention should be paid to the hereditary chiefs and nobles, the Ulee Balang, who he felt could be trusted as local administrators. However, he argued, Aceh's religious leaders, the ulema, could not be trusted or persuaded to co-operate, and must be destroyed. As part of a policy of divide-and-conquer, Hurgronje urged the Dutch leadership to widen the existing gulf between the Acehnese nobility and the religious leaders.
Hurgronje was a friend of the Arab Grand Mufti of Batavia, Habib Usman bin Yahya, who issued a fatwa to support the Dutch war against Aceh.
In 1894, the penghulu or judge Hasan Mustafa also helped bring a stop to the fighting by issuing a fatwa, telling the Muslims to submit to the Dutch colonial government.
Pacification
In 1898, Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh, and with his lieutenant, later Dutch Prime Minister Hendrikus Colijn, would finally conquer most of Aceh. They followed Hurgronje's suggestions, finding cooperative uleebelang that would support them in the countryside and isolating the resistance from their rural support base. The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counter-insurgency warfare by deploying light-armed Marechaussee units and using scorched earth tactics. Van Heutsz charged Colonel Gotfried Coenraad Ernst van Daalen with breaking remaining resistance.
In 1903, the main secular Acehnese resistance leaders including Sultan Alauddin Muhammad Da'ud Syah II, Tuanku Raja Keumala, Mahmud, and Muda Perkasa capitulated. During the 1904 campaign, Colonel van Daalen destroyed several villages, killing at least 2,922 Acehnese, among which were 1,149 women and children during the 1904 campaign. Dutch losses numbered 26, and van Daalen was promoted. Episodes of marked Dutch military cruelty occurred during this period. Photographs of a June 1904 Dutch massacre in Kuta Reh village of the Alas people taken during the Dutch military expedition in Aceh, Gayo, and Alas regions, for example, indicate that killings of large groups of civilians occurred on some occasions. By the end of 1904, most of Aceh was under Dutch control, and had an indigenous government that cooperated with the colonial state. The Dutch consolidated their control over Aceh by practising a policy of religious tolerance as a means of dissuading the Acehnese from taking up an armed struggle. According to Historian Adrian Vickers, during the entire Aceh war, 50,000 to 60,000 Acehnese died from violence and disease, approximately 2,000 European and allied indigenous soldiers were killed in combat, and more than 35,000 soldiers and labourers died from disease. The destruction of entire communities also caused 10,000 Acehnese to flee to neighbouring Malaya.
Colijn wrote a letter to his wife detailing the atrocities of the conflict:
I have seen a mother carrying a child of about 6 months old on her left arm, with a long lance in her right hand, who was running in our direction. One of our bullets killed the mother as well as the child. From now on we couldn't give any mercy, it was over. I did give orders to gather a group of 9 women and 3 children who asked for mercy and they were shot all together. It was not a pleasant job, but something else was impossible. Our soldiers tacked them with pleasure with their bayonets. It was horrible. I will stop reporting now.