Schematic plan · Arab-Israeli, 1948

Operation Yevusi

21 April 1948
West Bank
Draw

All battles The event in the chronicle Wikipedia

A schematic plan, generated from the statistics of the CAA Database of Battles: the armies' size and width, the hours of fighting, the plan of attack and the outcome are as recorded; the ground and the positions are not.

Israel (Is Rgt, 3,000 men under unrecorded commanders) attacked Jordan (Jor Rgt, 3,600 men under unrecorded commanders) in West Bank. The CAA Database of Battles records 936 hours of fighting on a front of 10 km, a frontal attack against prepared defense, and that neither side won. Losses: Israel 375 (13%), Jordan 500 (14%).

This plan is generated from those figures. It shows the shape of the battle the database describes: the size and width of the armies, the plan of attack and the outcome. It does not show where the units actually stood.

The armies

Israel

Unit	Arm	Men
Israel left wing	Infantry	695
Israel centre	Infantry	926
Israel right wing	Infantry	695
Israel reserve	Infantry	579
Israel artillery (2 guns)	Artillery	30
Israel armour (15 tanks)	Armour	75
Israel command	Commander	—
In this plan		3,000

Jordan

Unit	Arm	Men
Jordan left wing	Infantry	840
Jordan centre	Infantry	1,120
Jordan right wing	Infantry	840
Jordan reserve	Infantry	700
Jordan artillery (4 guns)	Artillery	60
Jordan armour (8 tanks)	Armour	40
Jordan command	Commander	—
In this plan		3,600

What the sources report

	Israel	Jordan
Strength, this plan	3,000	3,600
Losses, this plan	375	500

In the CAA Database of Battles

CDB90 no. 655, “Jerusalem (Jebussi)”, compiled for the US Army to study what decides battles. These are the figures a what-if engine can be calibrated against.

Fighting: 936 hours
Winner: the draw
Terrain: Rugged, Mixed
Weather: Dry, Temperate, Spring, Desert
Defender’s posture: Prepared defense
Front width: 10 km (attacker), null km (defender)

Force	Strength	Losses	Horse	Guns	Plan and outcome
Israelattacker	3,000	375	0	2	Frontal attack
Jordandefender	3,600	500	0	4	—

Attacker’s advantages none recorded

CDB90 (US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1990), tidy edition by Jeffrey B. Arnold; data under ODC-BY 1.0.

Notes

On this reconstruction

Generated automatically from the statistics in CDB90. Frontages, depths, distances, the order of events and the terrain are schematic: they follow the recorded strengths, front widths, hours of fighting, tactical plan and outcome, not maps or accounts of the battle. The sources give no hours; the timing is conjectural.

Sources

US Army Concepts Analysis Agency; tidy edition by Jeffrey B. Arnold, CAA Database of Battles (CDB90), no. 655 · ODC-BY-1.0Strengths, losses, front widths, hours of fighting, tactics and outcome.
Wikipedia contributors, Operation Yevusi · CC-BY-SA-4.0

Facts gathered from Wikidata (CC0), Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0) and Wikimedia Commons (licence per file); the plan and its text are timeastra’s own.