Schematic plan · Arab-Israeli War, 1967 (Six-Day War)

Battle of Bir Gifgafa

A schematic plan, generated from the statistics of the CAA Database of Battles: the armies' size and width, the hours of fighting, the plan of attack and the outcome are as recorded; the ground and the positions are not.
Flat, Desert groundCentreCentreLeft wingRight wingLeft wingRight wingReserveReserveArmourArmour01 km2 kmN

Egypt (Eg Armd Bde, 3,500 men under unrecorded commanders) attacked Israel (Is Tal Div, 3,600 men under Col Gonen) in Egypt. The CAA Database of Battles records 3 hours of fighting on a front of 5 km, a frontal attack against hasty defense, and that Israel held. Losses: Egypt 450 (13%), Israel 60 (2%).

This plan is generated from those figures. It shows the shape of the battle the database describes: the size and width of the armies, the plan of attack and the outcome. It does not show where the units actually stood.

The armies

Egypt

UnitArmMen
Egypt left wingInfantry768
Egypt centreInfantry1,024
Egypt right wingInfantry768
Egypt reserveInfantry640
Egypt armour (60 tanks)Armour300
Egypt commandCommander—
In this plan3,500

Israel

Col Gonen

UnitArmMen
Israel left wingInfantry780
Israel centreInfantry1,040
Israel right wingInfantry780
Israel reserveInfantry650
Israel armour (70 tanks)Armour350
Col GonenCommander—
In this plan3,600

What the sources report

EgyptIsrael
Strength, this plan3,5003,600
Losses, this plan45060

In the CAA Database of Battles

CDB90 no. 564, “Bir Gifgafa”, compiled for the US Army to study what decides battles. These are the figures a what-if engine can be calibrated against.

Fighting
3 hours
Winner
the defender
Terrain
Flat, Desert
Weather
Dry, Sunny, Hot, Summer, Temperate
Defender’s posture
Hasty defense
Front width
5 km (attacker), 5 km (defender)
ForceStrengthLossesHorseGunsPlan and outcome
Egyptattacker3,50045000Frontal attack; Withdrew with heavy losses
Israeldefender3,6006000Defensive/offensive plan; Double envelopment; Pursued

Attacker’s advantages none recorded

CDB90 (US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1990), tidy edition by Jeffrey B. Arnold; data under ODC-BY 1.0.

Notes

On this reconstruction

Generated automatically from the statistics in CDB90. Frontages, depths, distances, the order of events and the terrain are schematic: they follow the recorded strengths, front widths, hours of fighting, tactical plan and outcome, not maps or accounts of the battle. The sources give no hours; the timing is conjectural.

Sources

Facts gathered from Wikidata (CC0), Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 4.0) and Wikimedia Commons (licence per file); the plan and its text are timeastra’s own.